Matt Foley 2012-10-12, 21:01
Could you please explain what is the difference between Hadoop 1.0.4
just accepted and Hadoop 1.1.0 being
voted at the same time? Also why is it important to keep and release
both of these branches?
I am lost here. I assume other people might have that question in mind as well.
On Fri, Oct 12, 2012 at 2:01 PM, Matt Foley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The release of Hadoop-1.0.4 has been voted, accepted, and posted.
> It is available in SVN and Maven, as well as at
> It is still propagating to mirrors, and should be available on all mirrors
> by this time Saturday.
> The documentation update is still being worked on and will be available by
> This release is noteworthy for including a Security bug fix, related to
> discovered by Daryn Sharp and fixed by Owen O'Malley. The CVE announcement
> is below.
> Best regards,
> --Matt Foley
> Release Manager
> *CVE-2012-4449: Apache Hadoop security token vulnerabilities
> Severity: Critical
> Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation
> Versions Affected:
> 0.20.X: All versions
> 0.23: All versions before 0.23.4
> 1.0: All versions before 1.0.4
> 2.0: All versions before 2.0.2
> Users affected:
> Users who have enabled Hadoop's Kerberos security features.
> Malicious users may crack the secret keys used to sign security
> tokens, thus granting them the ability to fabricate tokens for
> privilege escalation. Malicious users may also launch unauthorized
> tasks as an arbitrary user for privilege escalation.
> When Hadoop's security features are enabled, clients initially present
> Kerberos credentials to authenticate to a service such as the
> NameNode. A client may then request a security token for subsequent
> authentication within the Hadoop cluster. The client receives a
> security token and a corresponding signature for the token, generated
> using the HMAC algorithm and a SHA1 hash.
> Token passwords are generated using a trivial secret key length (20
> bits). A key of this size can be brute forced in at most a few
> seconds. Once the secret is cracked, one can generate arbitrary
> tokens to impersonate other users. These fraudulent tokens may be
> used to gain unauthorized access to data or disrupt services within
> the cluster. With default secret key rolling values, a cracked secret
> may often be exploited for a couple days before another secret has to
> be cracked.
> Some token-based services, such as the NameNode's delegation tokens
> for the namespace, are immune from a compromised secret key because
> they record the generated tokens. A fraudulent token with a valid
> password will rejected since the service will know it did not generate
> the token. Services that generate a token on behalf of another
> service and rely on a shared secret for the other service to validate
> the token's password are especially vulnerable.
> HDFS (all versions):
> Malicious clients cannot gain unauthorized access to the namespace.
> Malicious clients may however gain full access (read, write, and
> delete) to any block based on knowledge of the block id.
> MapReduce (1.x):
> Malicious clients may intercept task data, task logs, alter task
> status, and disrupt tasks from executing or completing. A malicious
> client may also inject data into a Pipes-based job.
> Yarn (2.x only):
> Malicious clients may perform the same attacks as MapReduce. An
> unauthorized yarn task may be launched unbeknownst to the
> ResourceManager. Additionally, the security tokens for launching
> tasks do not contain the job submitter. The user for task execution
> is specified in an untrusted container launch context, thus allowing a
> task to be launched as an arbitrary user. When combined, an
> unauthorized task may be launched as an arbitrary user.
> Other Hadoop projects:
> Hadoop projects using the token management framework may be
Konstantin Boudnik 2012-10-15, 02:41
Matt Foley 2012-10-15, 04:24
Konstantin Boudnik 2012-10-15, 17:27